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Abstract: All over the world, we see that communities with the greatest dental need receive the poorest care – a truism ﬁ rst summarised 
by the Inverse Care Law in 1971.  Despite efforts to attract dentists to under-served areas with incentives such as ‘deprivation payments’, 
the playing ﬁ eld is still uphill because of the fundamental inequalities which exist in society itself.  Deep-seated cultural values which are 
accepting of a power difference between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, and that emphasise individualism over collectivism, are hard to shift. 
The marketization of health care contributes, by reinforcing these values through the commodiﬁ cation of care, which stresses efﬁ ciency 
and the transactional aspects of service provision. In response, practitioners working in deprived areas develop ‘scripts’ of routines that 
deliver ‘satisfactory care’, which are in accord with the wishes of patients who place little value on oral health but which also maintain 
the viability of the practice as a business. A compliance framework contrasting types of organisational (dental practice) power (coercive, 
utilitarian, normative) with types of patient orientation (alienative, calculative, moral) identiﬁ es where certain combinations ‘work’ (e.g. 
normative power – moral orientation), but where others struggle. Thus institutional structures combine with patients’ and the wider com-
munity’s demands, to generate a model of dental care which leaves little scope for ongoing, preventive dental treatment. This means that 
in poor areas, all too often, not only is less care available, it is of lower quality too - just where it is needed most.
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‘The availability of good medical care tends to vary 
inversely with the need for it in the population served’.
This oft-quoted truth has been repeated many times since 
its original publication in 1971 (Hart, 1971). In fact, this ‘law’ 
has been so often demonstrated in a whole range of health 
care contexts, that Julian Tudor Hart himself has commented 
that: ‘You name it, there’s now some inverse law for it, or 
soon will be. The world never runs out of injustice’ (Hart, 
2000). In dentistry, Hart’s law is just as much apparent as 
in any other branch of health care – or even more so, given 
that in many parts of the world, dental services are organised 
according to a commercial model of care. Services are often 
inﬂ uenced not just by what the patient needs, but by what 
people are willing and able to buy. 
When plots of national English and Welsh data are drawn 
looking at the proportion of the population in each county 
area who live with chronic ill health, against the proportion of 
that same local population who are working as medical prac-
titioners, we see the Inverse Care Law clearly demonstrated 
(Shaw and Dorling, 2004). An almost identical pattern is seen 
when the distribution of dental practitioners is plotted. What 
stands in stark contrast, however, is a similar plot showing a 
direct relationship between population health needs and the 
proportion of the population who provide signiﬁ cant amounts 
of unpaid care for friends, family, neighbours or their local 
community – the ‘Positive Care Law’ (Shaw and Dorling, 
2004). This then raises a difﬁ cult question. Why, when altru-
ism is seen everywhere, and in the greatest quantities where 
it is most needed; is ‘positive care’ so hard to achieve when 
we try to deliver medical - or dental care?
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Maldistribution of the workforce is certainly part of the 
issue, both for doctors (Hann and Gravelle, 2004) and den-
tists (Buck, 1999; Kiadaliri et al., 2013). However, although 
there have been efforts to increase workforce supply in 
England by introducing entry controls (limiting of practices 
in over-supplied areas) and using one-off payments to reward 
practising in under-served areas; this has generally failed to 
achieve a balance between supply and where services are 
needed most (Hart, 2004). Hart puts the blame for this on 
the market economy: ‘Government policies may use one little 
ﬁ nger to encourage doctors to work where they are needed, 
but they use the other nine and all their toes to encourage a 
private economy devoted to making rich people richer, and 
an increasing unequal society. The little ﬁ nger, of course, 
is losing’ (Hart, 2004). In other words, the roots of social 
inequalities in the provision of health care lie as deep as 
the inequalities which exist in society itself.  When culture 
is orientated towards an individual rather than collective 
perspective, and is accepting of a power difference between 
the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, it can be no surprise that when 
doctors (or dentists) are able to choose where they work, 
they go to middle class areas. 
The marketization of health care is both an expres-
sion of these cultural values and a mechanism by which 
the Inverse Care Law is re-enforced. Titmuss (1970) 
evokes an analogy contrasting the donation of human 
blood in the UK with the selling of blood in the United 
States to illustrate this: ‘When a person gives their 
blood to another person, the act is altruistic, unselﬁ sh 
and unconditional; but when a donor sells their blood, 
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the relationship becomes mechanical, impersonal and 
responsive to pressures of demand and supply’. Hart 
(2004) himself concludes that ‘the closer we get to the 
world of business, the more our distribution of resources 
is based on greed and not need’. Unfortunately, with 
the growing inﬂ uence of quasi-market ideology, health 
systems in many countries have become more and more 
based on market principles (Harris et al., 2014). The 
moral consequences of this is that health ‘care’ becomes 
commodiﬁ ed, and this curtails open-ended, unscripted, 
compassionate interactions, leaving little room for ‘the 
non-player, the person who can’t buy in – the poor, the 
uninsured, the uninsurable’ (Pelligrino, 1999).
Before departing from the broader perspective to focus 
on the particularly commercial and market-driven world 
of providing dental services, it is worth noting one further 
thing – that even where ﬁ nancial incentives have success-
fully attracted doctors to under-served areas, the reality of 
practice in these areas is less like a levelled ‘playing ﬁ eld’, 
and more like a ‘swimming pool’ - where everyone (all 
practitioners) who can be seen, have their heads above 
water. However, those in afﬂ uent areas are ‘standing with 
their feet on the bottom, whereas those in deprived areas are 
treading water in the deep end’ (Watt, 2000). Julian Tudor 
Hart, who himself worked as a family doctor in a poor, coal 
mining community in the Afan Valley in Wales in the 1960s 
and 70s, knew what ‘treading water in the deep end’ felt 
like (Moorhead, 2004). He recalls, not only the experience 
of working in an environment where population need was 
overwhelming, but the consequences of that experience – 
that the quality of care suffers, and ‘some conditions are 
bad enough to change a good doctor into a bad doctor in a 
very short time’ (Hart, 1971).
‘In the circumstances prevailing, the most 
essential qualiﬁ cation…is ability to make a snap 
diagnostician – an ability to reach an accurate 
diagnosis on a minimum of evidence...the worst 
elements of general practice are to be found in 
those places where there is the greatest and most 
urgent need for good medical service.’ (Hart, 1971)
Hence the Inverse Care Law describes an uncomfort-
able truth: that it is not just the amount of care available, 
but the quality of care provided which is inversely related 
to patients’ need. Moreover, when commercial interests are 
added, practitioners come up with ‘workable’ solutions, to 
the further detriment of good quality care.
‘The general practitioner in working class areas 
discovered the well-tried business principle of small 
proﬁ ts where the population was large and growing 
rapidly; it paid to treat many people for a small 
fee. A waiting-room crammed with patients, each 
representing 2s. 6d [£0.13] for a consultation… not 
only gave a satisfactory income, but also reduced the 
inclination to practise clinical medicine with skilful 
care, to attend clinical meetings or to seek refresh-
ment from the scientiﬁ c literature.’ (Hart, 1971)
Institutional theory explains this ‘pollution’ of professional 
standards in terms of embedded agency, where practition-
ers are agents who both shape their environment, and are 
shaped by it (Garud et al., 2007; Harris and Holt, 2013). 
Dental practices can be likened to an organisational ﬁ eld – 
where there is a common meaning system with participants 
interacting more ‘frequently and fatefully’ with each other, 
than with actors outside the ﬁ eld (Scott, 2001). There are 
institutional ‘rules’ or patterns of behaviour, only some of 
which are written down and prescribed, for example by 
the profession or regulators. Day-to-day interactions with a 
variety of other people and bodies (patients, other clinicians, 
managers, suppliers, commissioners) inform the development 
of ‘scripts’; which are ‘observable, recurrent activities and 
patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting’ 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  These daily routines deﬁ ne how 
the business operates (who the patients (customers) are, and 
what is delivered), (Harris et al., 2015a). In deprived areas, 
the prevailing service model and dental ‘product’ then all 
too often evolves into high patient turnover practices, geared 
towards meeting immediate needs - ‘extractive’, rather than 
preventive dentistry.  An ecological study of Brazilian primary 
health care units (PHCs) provides us with just one example. 
In areas with a high degree of social vulnerability, the local 
population receives less, not more preventive dental care, 
relative to restorative and surgical procedures (Esteves et 
al., 2013). The Inverse Care Law is demonstrated yet again. 
An institutional perspective portrays practitioners’ be-
haviour as simultaneously both shaping what services are 
provided, and also being shaped by what patients want to 
receive. In the same way as human ecology understands hu-
man beings in terms of their interactions with each other and 
their environment (for example, just as there are waterborne 
and airborne diseases, there are ‘culture borne’ diseases), so 
we see community and patients’ values regarding dental care 
inﬂ uencing both what is wanted, but also what is provided 
by dental services. So do poor areas then end up with the 
dental services they deserve?  In other words, if a practice 
serves a population in an impoverished area, which place 
little value on the preservation of the natural dentition, does 
this shape the type of dental service which is provided? 
Qualitative data from a study of dental contracting suggests 
that it does (Harris et al., 2015b).  In low socio-economic 
practices, clinical interactions are brief, functional, and 
limited, but this meets with patients’ views of dentistry as 
a necessary evil:
I: Do you know anything about Mr (Biller)’s 
reputation in the area? (a deprived area)
R: Well they call him Killer (Biller) don’t they?
I: I didn’t know that! Do they? Killer (Biller)! 
That’s brilliant. Why?
R: I think because he just gets on with job you 
know, He’s very quick. He’s not very person-
able. You’re in and out. Job done but I mean 
all dentists is painful isn’t it?
When we consider how social exchanges between clini-
cians and patients tend to be played out, this also supports 
the supposition that the way dentists interact with patients 
is inﬂ uenced by the patients’ approach to communication 
in that environment (as well as the communication skills of 
the clinician and any preconceptions that they hold of that 
‘type’ of patient of course). Studies show that clinical com-
munication is a two-way affair - clinicians are inﬂ uenced by 
the patients’communicative style – such as question-asking, 
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‘The availability of good medical care tends to vary 
inversely with the need for it in the population served’.
This oft-quoted truth has been repeated many times since 
its original publication in 1971 (Hart, 1971). In fact, this ‘law’ 
has been so often demonstrated in a whole range of health 
care contexts, that Julian Tudor Hart himself has commented 
that: ‘You name it, there’s now some inverse law for it, or 
soon will be. The world never runs out of injustice’ (Hart, 
2000). In dentistry, Hart’s law is just as much apparent as 
in any other branch of health care – or even more so, given 
that in many parts of the world, dental services are organised 
according to a commercial model of care. Services are often 
inﬂ uenced not just by what the patient needs, but by what 
people are willing and able to buy. 
When plots of national English and Welsh data are drawn 
looking at the proportion of the population in each county 
area who live with chronic ill health, against the proportion of 
that same local population who are working as medical prac-
titioners, we see the Inverse Care Law clearly demonstrated 
(Shaw and Dorling, 2004). An almost identical pattern is seen 
when the distribution of dental practitioners is plotted. What 
stands in stark contrast, however, is a similar plot showing a 
direct relationship between population health needs and the 
proportion of the population who provide signiﬁ cant amounts 
of unpaid care for friends, family, neighbours or their local 
community – the ‘Positive Care Law’ (Shaw and Dorling, 
2004). This then raises a difﬁ cult question. Why, when altru-
ism is seen everywhere, and in the greatest quantities where 
it is most needed; is ‘positive care’ so hard to achieve when 
we try to deliver medical - or dental care?
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Maldistribution of the workforce is certainly part of the 
issue, both for doctors (Hann and Gravelle, 2004) and den-
tists (Buck, 1999; Kiadaliri et al., 2013). However, although 
there have been efforts to increase workforce supply in 
England by introducing entry controls (limiting of practices 
in over-supplied areas) and using one-off payments to reward 
practising in under-served areas; this has generally failed to 
achieve a balance between supply and where services are 
needed most (Hart, 2004). Hart puts the blame for this on 
the market economy: ‘Government policies may use one little 
ﬁ nger to encourage doctors to work where they are needed, 
but they use the other nine and all their toes to encourage a 
private economy devoted to making rich people richer, and 
an increasing unequal society. The little ﬁ nger, of course, 
is losing’ (Hart, 2004). In other words, the roots of social 
inequalities in the provision of health care lie as deep as 
the inequalities which exist in society itself.  When culture 
is orientated towards an individual rather than collective 
perspective, and is accepting of a power difference between 
the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, it can be no surprise that when 
doctors (or dentists) are able to choose where they work, 
they go to middle class areas. 
The marketization of health care is both an expres-
sion of these cultural values and a mechanism by which 
the Inverse Care Law is re-enforced. Titmuss (1970) 
evokes an analogy contrasting the donation of human 
blood in the UK with the selling of blood in the United 
States to illustrate this: ‘When a person gives their 
blood to another person, the act is altruistic, unselﬁ sh 
and unconditional; but when a donor sells their blood, 
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the relationship becomes mechanical, impersonal and 
responsive to pressures of demand and supply’. Hart 
(2004) himself concludes that ‘the closer we get to the 
world of business, the more our distribution of resources 
is based on greed and not need’. Unfortunately, with 
the growing inﬂ uence of quasi-market ideology, health 
systems in many countries have become more and more 
based on market principles (Harris et al., 2014). The 
moral consequences of this is that health ‘care’ becomes 
commodiﬁ ed, and this curtails open-ended, unscripted, 
compassionate interactions, leaving little room for ‘the 
non-player, the person who can’t buy in – the poor, the 
uninsured, the uninsurable’ (Pelligrino, 1999).
Before departing from the broader perspective to focus 
on the particularly commercial and market-driven world 
of providing dental services, it is worth noting one further 
thing – that even where ﬁ nancial incentives have success-
fully attracted doctors to under-served areas, the reality of 
practice in these areas is less like a levelled ‘playing ﬁ eld’, 
and more like a ‘swimming pool’ - where everyone (all 
practitioners) who can be seen, have their heads above 
water. However, those in afﬂ uent areas are ‘standing with 
their feet on the bottom, whereas those in deprived areas are 
treading water in the deep end’ (Watt, 2000). Julian Tudor 
Hart, who himself worked as a family doctor in a poor, coal 
mining community in the Afan Valley in Wales in the 1960s 
and 70s, knew what ‘treading water in the deep end’ felt 
like (Moorhead, 2004). He recalls, not only the experience 
of working in an environment where population need was 
overwhelming, but the consequences of that experience – 
that the quality of care suffers, and ‘some conditions are 
bad enough to change a good doctor into a bad doctor in a 
very short time’ (Hart, 1971).
‘In the circumstances prevailing, the most 
essential qualiﬁ cation…is ability to make a snap 
diagnostician – an ability to reach an accurate 
diagnosis on a minimum of evidence...the worst 
elements of general practice are to be found in 
those places where there is the greatest and most 
urgent need for good medical service.’ (Hart, 1971)
Hence the Inverse Care Law describes an uncomfort-
able truth: that it is not just the amount of care available, 
but the quality of care provided which is inversely related 
to patients’ need. Moreover, when commercial interests are 
added, practitioners come up with ‘workable’ solutions, to 
the further detriment of good quality care.
‘The general practitioner in working class areas 
discovered the well-tried business principle of small 
proﬁ ts where the population was large and growing 
rapidly; it paid to treat many people for a small 
fee. A waiting-room crammed with patients, each 
representing 2s. 6d [£0.13] for a consultation… not 
only gave a satisfactory income, but also reduced the 
inclination to practise clinical medicine with skilful 
care, to attend clinical meetings or to seek refresh-
ment from the scientiﬁ c literature.’ (Hart, 1971)
Institutional theory explains this ‘pollution’ of professional 
standards in terms of embedded agency, where practition-
ers are agents who both shape their environment, and are 
shaped by it (Garud et al., 2007; Harris and Holt, 2013). 
Dental practices can be likened to an organisational ﬁ eld – 
where there is a common meaning system with participants 
interacting more ‘frequently and fatefully’ with each other, 
than with actors outside the ﬁ eld (Scott, 2001). There are 
institutional ‘rules’ or patterns of behaviour, only some of 
which are written down and prescribed, for example by 
the profession or regulators. Day-to-day interactions with a 
variety of other people and bodies (patients, other clinicians, 
managers, suppliers, commissioners) inform the development 
of ‘scripts’; which are ‘observable, recurrent activities and 
patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting’ 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  These daily routines deﬁ ne how 
the business operates (who the patients (customers) are, and 
what is delivered), (Harris et al., 2015a). In deprived areas, 
the prevailing service model and dental ‘product’ then all 
too often evolves into high patient turnover practices, geared 
towards meeting immediate needs - ‘extractive’, rather than 
preventive dentistry.  An ecological study of Brazilian primary 
health care units (PHCs) provides us with just one example. 
In areas with a high degree of social vulnerability, the local 
population receives less, not more preventive dental care, 
relative to restorative and surgical procedures (Esteves et 
al., 2013). The Inverse Care Law is demonstrated yet again. 
An institutional perspective portrays practitioners’ be-
haviour as simultaneously both shaping what services are 
provided, and also being shaped by what patients want to 
receive. In the same way as human ecology understands hu-
man beings in terms of their interactions with each other and 
their environment (for example, just as there are waterborne 
and airborne diseases, there are ‘culture borne’ diseases), so 
we see community and patients’ values regarding dental care 
inﬂ uencing both what is wanted, but also what is provided 
by dental services. So do poor areas then end up with the 
dental services they deserve?  In other words, if a practice 
serves a population in an impoverished area, which place 
little value on the preservation of the natural dentition, does 
this shape the type of dental service which is provided? 
Qualitative data from a study of dental contracting suggests 
that it does (Harris et al., 2015b).  In low socio-economic 
practices, clinical interactions are brief, functional, and 
limited, but this meets with patients’ views of dentistry as 
a necessary evil:
I: Do you know anything about Mr (Biller)’s 
reputation in the area? (a deprived area)
R: Well they call him Killer (Biller) don’t they?
I: I didn’t know that! Do they? Killer (Biller)! 
That’s brilliant. Why?
R: I think because he just gets on with job you 
know, He’s very quick. He’s not very person-
able. You’re in and out. Job done but I mean 
all dentists is painful isn’t it?
When we consider how social exchanges between clini-
cians and patients tend to be played out, this also supports 
the supposition that the way dentists interact with patients 
is inﬂ uenced by the patients’ approach to communication 
in that environment (as well as the communication skills of 
the clinician and any preconceptions that they hold of that 
‘type’ of patient of course). Studies show that clinical com-
munication is a two-way affair - clinicians are inﬂ uenced by 
the patients’communicative style – such as question-asking, 
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affective expressiveness and opinion-giving in determining 
how much information they give (Verlinde et al., 2012). 
Therefore, because patients from poorer backgrounds tend 
to be less affectively expressive, they end up receiving less 
information and also less affective behaviour or ‘warmth’ 
from clinicians (Street, 2005). Studies also show that patients 
from poorer backgrounds prefer a more directive consulta-
tion style (they are less used to, or feel less able to interact 
during the appointment), and this also curtails the depth and 
openness of the discourse (Verlinde et al., 2012).  
Etzoni (1961) terms this type of approach as an ‘aliena-
tive’ (hostile) patient orientation, contrasting this to a moral 
(much more expressive) patient orientation. A calculative 
orientation is somewhere between the two, where the patient 
is decides the extent to which they are expressive, depending 
on the situation. Etzioni (1961) also draws up a typology 
organisational approaches which might be adopted in order 
to achieve patients’ compliance, and then sets three types 
of organisational power against patient orientation type, to 
generate a nine-fold typology of compliance relationships 
(Table 1). Alternative organisational approaches to achiev-
ing compliance include: a) exercise of coercive power (for 
example in prison regimes); b) utilitarian power (or the use 
of incentives such as money or other rewards which members 
desire and the organisation controls); and c) normative power 
(or using symbols such as prestige or affections to secure 
loyalty). Etzioni (1961) argues that the more compatible 
the patient orientation is with the organisation’s approach 
to exercising power, the more effective the organisation is 
in achieving its organisational goals.  In other words, much 
as in the same way that institutional theorists propose that 
institutional structures are shaped by the functions they set 
out to achieve, this compliance framework suggests that 
certain combinations e.g. normative power/moral orientation; 
utilitarian power/ calculative orientation and coercive power/
alienative orientation ‘work’ to create effective organisations. 
Davis (1976) takes up Etzioni’s framework and ap-
plies this to the dental context. He identiﬁ es that a ‘strain 
to consistency’ exists so that where a particular style of 
patient orientation exists in a community, certain types of 
dental practice emerge – for example in a high social class 
area, where patients have a predominantly moral orientation, 
dental services using a normative approach to power are 
successful. By contrast then, a more coercive approach to 
power (such as in a school dental clinic, or a Mr Biller type 
practice) emerges as successful in a working class area on 
account of the predominantly alienative patient orientation 
in the population. Practices employing less coercive forms 
of delivering dental care for the same population would be 
less successful. Davis, however, does concede that whilst 
a ‘strain to consistency’ exists, this does not preclude the 
function of other organisational forms – his argument is 
that they will just struggle more to be successful.  Hence 
although coercive control might beﬁ t a population generally 
hostile to practitioners’ authority, for ethical reasons this type 
of organisational form might be out of the question, other 
than say for children or prison inmates - leaving utilitarian 
approaches as the next best (albeit relatively less effective) 
option. The reason solo dental practices are singled out as 
being more likely to thrive among alienative populations 
than calculative or moral ones (Table 1), is because in solo 
practice, the solo practitioner’s authority is relatively more 
fragile and open to challenge, and challenges are more likely 
when interacting with patients holding with a calculative/ 
moral orientation. Unfortunately, studies show that clinical 
practise is more outdated in solo practices and the quality 
of care is weaker (Gordan et al., 2010; Szymkowiak et al., 
1995). The Inverse Care Law is re-enforced.
So in deprived areas, normative approaches which 
emphasise the relational rather than transactional aspects 
of providing dental care are inclined to struggle. However, 
before concluding, it is important to acknowledge that 
dental practices delivering high quality preventive care for 
disadvantaged communities do exist, and that their work 
can be transformative for patients and the community.  It is 
worthwhile recalling here a ﬁ nal lesson from Hart’s experi-
ence of providing medical practice care in the Welsh Valleys. 
In his book ‘A new kind of doctor’ (Hart, 1988) he details 
the case of Hopkin Morgan, who was 36-years-old (a coal 
miner), when Hart began practising in 1961. He was six 
feet (183 cms) tall, weighed 103kg, and drank more than 5 
gallons (23 litres) of beer a week.  Clinically he had high 
cholesterol, very high blood pressure and kidney damage. 
Hart describes ‘serious problems with non-compliance with 
(anti-hypertensive) medication, at ﬁ rst because he didn’t 
understand the importance of good control and because 
I didn’t understand his antipathy to taking many different 
tablets’.  Hart reﬂ ects on his care for Hopkin 26 years later:
‘It was an unglamorous slog through a total 
of 310 consultations. For me it was about 41 
hours work with the patent, initially face to face, 
gradually shifting to side by side. Professionally 
the most satisfying and exciting things have been 
the events that have not happened: no strokes, 
no coronary heart attacks, no kidney failure…’ 
(Hart, 1988)








(sanctions and threat rather than 
persuasion)




Solo practice: working class 
area – extractive dentistry




Higher social class - 
preventive dentistry
Table 1. Kinds of practice and practice style by compliance relationship (Adapted from Davis, 1976)
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Thus Hart makes the case that care in these communi-
ties is particularly labour intensive - the very antithesis 
of drives towards greater efﬁ ciency, which is the main 
basis for the use of markets in health care.  In dentistry 
we ﬁ nd many ﬁ ne examples of practitioners, who like 
Hart, resist the dehumanising inﬂ uence of market-based 
systems, and instead exhibit an extent of prosocial behav-
iour similar to that which underpins Shaw and Dorling’s 
Positive Care Law. Here described in qualitative data from 
a UK study of dental practice contracting (Harris et al., 
2015b), experience of a ‘deep-end’ dentist establishing 
a preventive dentistry-based practice in a deprived area: 
‘You know it’s taken a lot of hard work, it’s 
taken a lot of effort, it’s taken a lot of blood 
and guts but you know we have got there. We 
have got to work harder, we have got to extend 
the sessions, we have got to extend the hours’.
This is the type of struggle predicted by Davis (1976) 
when practitioners attempt to deliver care in communi-
ties with alienative attitudes.  Hart (1971) identiﬁ es that 
courage is required of young men and women ‘setting 
up shop’ in under-privileged areas, but also that this is 
relatively unrecognised in the way that the profession 
acknowledges achievement. Since prestige is generally 
acquired through achieving technical excellence and suc-
cessful businesses, this leaves young graduates asking the 
question ‘Which is the top and which is the bottom of 
the ladder?’ (Hart, 1971).  And of course wider social 
attitudes regarding inequalities and even the incentives 
and governance arrangements in the health system itself, 
make practising in better-off areas more appealing.  It 
can therefore be no surprise that practitioners with the 
highest morale tend not to gravitate to the places where 
morale is most needed, and when we see the Inverse Care 
Law repeated in a whole range of health care settings, 
including dentistry. 
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affective expressiveness and opinion-giving in determining 
how much information they give (Verlinde et al., 2012). 
Therefore, because patients from poorer backgrounds tend 
to be less affectively expressive, they end up receiving less 
information and also less affective behaviour or ‘warmth’ 
from clinicians (Street, 2005). Studies also show that patients 
from poorer backgrounds prefer a more directive consulta-
tion style (they are less used to, or feel less able to interact 
during the appointment), and this also curtails the depth and 
openness of the discourse (Verlinde et al., 2012).  
Etzoni (1961) terms this type of approach as an ‘aliena-
tive’ (hostile) patient orientation, contrasting this to a moral 
(much more expressive) patient orientation. A calculative 
orientation is somewhere between the two, where the patient 
is decides the extent to which they are expressive, depending 
on the situation. Etzioni (1961) also draws up a typology 
organisational approaches which might be adopted in order 
to achieve patients’ compliance, and then sets three types 
of organisational power against patient orientation type, to 
generate a nine-fold typology of compliance relationships 
(Table 1). Alternative organisational approaches to achiev-
ing compliance include: a) exercise of coercive power (for 
example in prison regimes); b) utilitarian power (or the use 
of incentives such as money or other rewards which members 
desire and the organisation controls); and c) normative power 
(or using symbols such as prestige or affections to secure 
loyalty). Etzioni (1961) argues that the more compatible 
the patient orientation is with the organisation’s approach 
to exercising power, the more effective the organisation is 
in achieving its organisational goals.  In other words, much 
as in the same way that institutional theorists propose that 
institutional structures are shaped by the functions they set 
out to achieve, this compliance framework suggests that 
certain combinations e.g. normative power/moral orientation; 
utilitarian power/ calculative orientation and coercive power/
alienative orientation ‘work’ to create effective organisations. 
Davis (1976) takes up Etzioni’s framework and ap-
plies this to the dental context. He identiﬁ es that a ‘strain 
to consistency’ exists so that where a particular style of 
patient orientation exists in a community, certain types of 
dental practice emerge – for example in a high social class 
area, where patients have a predominantly moral orientation, 
dental services using a normative approach to power are 
successful. By contrast then, a more coercive approach to 
power (such as in a school dental clinic, or a Mr Biller type 
practice) emerges as successful in a working class area on 
account of the predominantly alienative patient orientation 
in the population. Practices employing less coercive forms 
of delivering dental care for the same population would be 
less successful. Davis, however, does concede that whilst 
a ‘strain to consistency’ exists, this does not preclude the 
function of other organisational forms – his argument is 
that they will just struggle more to be successful.  Hence 
although coercive control might beﬁ t a population generally 
hostile to practitioners’ authority, for ethical reasons this type 
of organisational form might be out of the question, other 
than say for children or prison inmates - leaving utilitarian 
approaches as the next best (albeit relatively less effective) 
option. The reason solo dental practices are singled out as 
being more likely to thrive among alienative populations 
than calculative or moral ones (Table 1), is because in solo 
practice, the solo practitioner’s authority is relatively more 
fragile and open to challenge, and challenges are more likely 
when interacting with patients holding with a calculative/ 
moral orientation. Unfortunately, studies show that clinical 
practise is more outdated in solo practices and the quality 
of care is weaker (Gordan et al., 2010; Szymkowiak et al., 
1995). The Inverse Care Law is re-enforced.
So in deprived areas, normative approaches which 
emphasise the relational rather than transactional aspects 
of providing dental care are inclined to struggle. However, 
before concluding, it is important to acknowledge that 
dental practices delivering high quality preventive care for 
disadvantaged communities do exist, and that their work 
can be transformative for patients and the community.  It is 
worthwhile recalling here a ﬁ nal lesson from Hart’s experi-
ence of providing medical practice care in the Welsh Valleys. 
In his book ‘A new kind of doctor’ (Hart, 1988) he details 
the case of Hopkin Morgan, who was 36-years-old (a coal 
miner), when Hart began practising in 1961. He was six 
feet (183 cms) tall, weighed 103kg, and drank more than 5 
gallons (23 litres) of beer a week.  Clinically he had high 
cholesterol, very high blood pressure and kidney damage. 
Hart describes ‘serious problems with non-compliance with 
(anti-hypertensive) medication, at ﬁ rst because he didn’t 
understand the importance of good control and because 
I didn’t understand his antipathy to taking many different 
tablets’.  Hart reﬂ ects on his care for Hopkin 26 years later:
‘It was an unglamorous slog through a total 
of 310 consultations. For me it was about 41 
hours work with the patent, initially face to face, 
gradually shifting to side by side. Professionally 
the most satisfying and exciting things have been 
the events that have not happened: no strokes, 
no coronary heart attacks, no kidney failure…’ 
(Hart, 1988)








(sanctions and threat rather than 
persuasion)




Solo practice: working class 
area – extractive dentistry




Higher social class - 
preventive dentistry
Table 1. Kinds of practice and practice style by compliance relationship (Adapted from Davis, 1976)
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Thus Hart makes the case that care in these communi-
ties is particularly labour intensive - the very antithesis 
of drives towards greater efﬁ ciency, which is the main 
basis for the use of markets in health care.  In dentistry 
we ﬁ nd many ﬁ ne examples of practitioners, who like 
Hart, resist the dehumanising inﬂ uence of market-based 
systems, and instead exhibit an extent of prosocial behav-
iour similar to that which underpins Shaw and Dorling’s 
Positive Care Law. Here described in qualitative data from 
a UK study of dental practice contracting (Harris et al., 
2015b), experience of a ‘deep-end’ dentist establishing 
a preventive dentistry-based practice in a deprived area: 
‘You know it’s taken a lot of hard work, it’s 
taken a lot of effort, it’s taken a lot of blood 
and guts but you know we have got there. We 
have got to work harder, we have got to extend 
the sessions, we have got to extend the hours’.
This is the type of struggle predicted by Davis (1976) 
when practitioners attempt to deliver care in communi-
ties with alienative attitudes.  Hart (1971) identiﬁ es that 
courage is required of young men and women ‘setting 
up shop’ in under-privileged areas, but also that this is 
relatively unrecognised in the way that the profession 
acknowledges achievement. Since prestige is generally 
acquired through achieving technical excellence and suc-
cessful businesses, this leaves young graduates asking the 
question ‘Which is the top and which is the bottom of 
the ladder?’ (Hart, 1971).  And of course wider social 
attitudes regarding inequalities and even the incentives 
and governance arrangements in the health system itself, 
make practising in better-off areas more appealing.  It 
can therefore be no surprise that practitioners with the 
highest morale tend not to gravitate to the places where 
morale is most needed, and when we see the Inverse Care 
Law repeated in a whole range of health care settings, 
including dentistry. 
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